PIMS Hospital Islamabad Fire: What Really Happened?
On the morning of August 26, 2026, a devastating fire broke out in the Mother and Child Health (MCH) Centre at the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences (PIMS), Islamabad).
Inside the nursery were newborn babies who were completely dependent on hospital staff for their safety.
Fourteen newborn babies lost their lives.
Only one baby survived after a staff nurse entered the burning nursery and brought the child out. The tragedy immediately raised a painful question across Pakistan:
How could a fire inside a hospital nursery turn into a mass-casualty disaster within minutes?
The answer is more complicated than simply asking where the fire started.
The government’s interim inquiry found serious concerns about fire-safety infrastructure, emergency procedures, training, supervision and communication. At the same time, investigators said the precise technical source of ignition had not yet been conclusively established.
What Happened Inside the PIMS Nursery?
According to the inquiry’s reconstruction using CCTV footage, the first visible emergency occurred at approximately 6:38 a.m.
Charge Nurse Nasreen was seen leaving the nursery and seeking assistance. Shortly afterward, she and a security guard entered the nursery.
Staff Nurse Razia then entered the burning nursery and managed to rescue one newborn.
CCTV showed her emerging with the baby approximately eight seconds after entering.
She attempted to go back inside, but conditions deteriorated extremely quickly.
The inquiry found that the nursery environment became catastrophically dangerous within approximately two minutes because of the rapidly spreading fire and smoke.
This is one of the most heartbreaking aspects of the incident: there was very little time to evacuate critically vulnerable newborns.
What Caused the Fire?
This is where the story needs careful examination.
Initial reports pointed toward different possible causes, including an air-conditioning unit, electrical problems and medical equipment. A preliminary PIMS account also discussed a spark and oxygen points around incubators.
However, the Prime Minister’s inquiry committee did not establish one definitive ignition source in its interim report.
The committee examined several possibilities, including:
- Air-conditioning equipment
- Incubators or warmers
- Electrical short circuit
- Plugs and sockets
- Internal electrical distribution
- Connected biomedical equipment
The inquiry specifically stated that it would be premature to identify a particular appliance or component as the confirmed cause until further forensic and technical examination is completed.
So, was the AC responsible?
Not conclusively.
Some early reports blamed an AC or electrical fault, but the interim inquiry says the exact ignition source remains technically unresolved.
That distinction is important because identifying the first spark is only one part of the investigation.
The bigger question is:
Why was a small fire able to become a disaster inside a nursery full of newborn babies?
The Bigger Failure: Fire Safety
The interim inquiry raises serious questions about the hospital’s ability to deal with a fire emergency.
Investigators found that the nursery did not have adequate fire-protection arrangements, including the absence of a proper fire alarm and sprinkler system.
The inquiry also found that PIMS did not have sufficiently detailed and properly implemented procedures and training specifically designed for fire and emergency situations.
Out of the hospital’s 13 standard operating procedures, only limited sections addressed fire or emergency situations.
For a hospital treating critically ill newborns, this raises an important question:
What happens when the patients cannot walk, cannot communicate and cannot escape on their own?
A neonatal ward requires a much higher level of emergency preparedness because every second matters.
Why Did the Fire Become So Dangerous So Quickly?
A nursery containing newborns can be an especially challenging environment during a fire.
The babies may be connected to:
- Incubators
- Oxygen supply
- Respiratory equipment
- Monitors
- Electrical medical equipment
The presence of oxygen and multiple electrical/medical devices can make fire prevention and emergency response particularly important.
But the inquiry makes an important distinction: investigators are examining both what started the fire and what allowed its consequences to become catastrophic.
Even if the initial spark came from an electrical or medical device, the central safety question remains whether proper systems could have contained the fire or enabled rapid evacuation.
Were Doctors and Nurses Absent?
This allegation circulated widely after the tragedy.
Some grieving families and witnesses questioned whether enough medical staff were present and whether rescue efforts began quickly enough.
But the interim inquiry does not support a generalized claim that frontline medical staff simply abandoned the babies.
CCTV evidence showed personnel attempting to respond.
The charge nurse sought assistance, a security guard entered the affected area, Staff Nurse Razia entered the burning nursery and rescued one baby, and a doctor was also seen in the affected area.
This does not remove questions about institutional preparedness or management responsibility.
Instead, it separates two issues:
Individual staff response during the fire
and
Institutional responsibility for having proper safety systems before the fire occurred.
That distinction is critical.
What About the Emergency Response?
Another major question concerns how quickly external emergency services were notified.
The inquiry’s CCTV and emergency-service records show an emergency becoming visible at around 6:38 a.m., while the Capital Emergency Services record shows receipt of the first emergency call at approximately 6:54 a.m., dispatch at 6:55 and arrival around 7:01.
However, the inquiry said other evidence reportedly referred to an earlier call, meaning investigators had not yet concluded exactly who made the first effective call and whether any avoidable delay occurred.
The committee therefore reserved this issue for further examination of telephone records, control-room logs, emergency call recordings and synchronized CCTV timings.
So it would be inaccurate to simply say that emergency services deliberately arrived late.
The real question is:
Was there a failure in the internal detection, escalation and notification system before the emergency call reached responders?
Who Has Been Held Responsible?
On the basis of the interim inquiry, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif ordered the suspension of eight officials and directed that disciplinary proceedings begin.
The officials identified in the interim report included:
- Prof. Dr. Imran Sikandar — Executive Director, PIMS
- Prof. Dr. Sadia Riaz — Head of Department, Neonatology
- Dr. Nagham — Senior Registrar, Neonatology
- Dr. Mutahir Shah — Joint Executive Director, MCH
- Ch. Waris Ali Raza — Joint Executive Director, Non-Medical, PIMS
- Dr. Nosheela Amjad — Director, MCH
- Dr. Abdul Rehman — Director General, CES, CDA
- Muhammad Usman — Assistant Director, Security
The Prime Minister also ordered that criminal proceedings be initiated against responsible persons.
However, suspension or recommendation for proceedings should not be confused with a final criminal conviction. Individual legal responsibility still has to be established through the appropriate process.
What Happened to the Security Staff?
The interim orders also placed Charge Nurse Nasreen and Security Guard Maria off duty pending further decisions after the final report.
At the same time, the report recognized Staff Nurse Razia for risking her life to rescue the only surviving baby.
The Prime Minister approved a Rs10 million financial reward for Razia and recommended her for a suitable civil award.
Her actions have received widespread public recognition, with later reports saying she is to receive the Sitara-i-Khidmat.
What About the Security Company?
The inquiry also raised concerns about the performance of the private security contractor.
The government ordered PIMS and the relevant ministry to review the contract with M/s Belfort Security, stating that the company had prima facie failed to fulfil contractual obligations.
The inquiry recommended further action if those alleged failures are confirmed.
This means the investigation is not limited to doctors or hospital management.
It also examines the role of external agencies and contractors.
Parliament Raises More Questions
The controversy did not end with the Prime Minister’s interim inquiry.
On August 31, 2026, the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on National Health Services expressed serious concerns about the investigation and demanded greater accountability.
The committee questioned:
- Fire alarms
- Sprinkler systems
- Electrical installations
- Air-conditioning equipment
- Oxygen arrangements
- Biomedical equipment
- Fire drills
- Staff training
- Emergency preparedness
- CCTV footage
- Equipment inspection records
- Fire-safety audits
- Maintenance and procurement records
The committee also asked for detailed information about the cause of death of each of the 14 infants.
Most importantly, parliamentarians argued that the investigation should not focus only on how the babies could have been rescued after the fire.
They also wanted answers to a much bigger question:
Why was the nursery vulnerable enough for the fire to become catastrophic in the first place?
The Earlier Warning: Another Fire at PIMS
One of the most disturbing details in the inquiry is that PIMS had reportedly experienced another fire incident at the Female Nursing Hostel on July 6, 2026.
According to the interim inquiry, the earlier incident had already identified deficiencies involving:
- Fire detection
- Alarm systems
- Evacuation preparedness
- Electrical inspection
- Security response
- Record keeping
The committee specifically examined the earlier incident because it could provide evidence about the institution’s existing knowledge of fire-safety problems and whether corrective measures had been taken.
This raises a serious institutional question:
If weaknesses had already been identified, what action was taken before the nursery tragedy?
Why the 14 Deaths Matter Beyond PIMS
This tragedy is not only about one hospital.
It raises broader questions about emergency preparedness in Pakistan’s healthcare system.
Hospitals contain some of the most vulnerable people in society:
- Newborn babies
- Patients on ventilators
- People in intensive care
- Elderly patients
- Patients who cannot walk
- Patients dependent on oxygen or medical equipment
For these patients, a fire evacuation plan cannot depend on people simply running toward an exit.
Hospitals need:
working alarms + sprinklers + trained staff + clear evacuation routes + emergency drills + functioning equipment + strong command systems.
Without these systems, a relatively small incident can become a major disaster.
Who Is Really Responsible?
At this stage, it would be wrong to give a final verdict before the investigation and legal proceedings are completed.
But the evidence available from the interim inquiry points toward a broader question of institutional and administrative responsibility, rather than simply blaming one nurse, one doctor or one piece of equipment.
There are several separate questions:
1. Who or what started the fire?
Still not conclusively established.
2. Why did the fire spread so quickly?
Investigators are examining the nursery’s equipment, electrical systems, oxygen environment and physical conditions.
3. Were proper fire-safety systems available?
The inquiry identified major shortcomings.
4. Was there a properly trained emergency evacuation system?
The inquiry raised serious concerns about the absence of a clearly demonstrated, nursery-specific and rehearsed evacuation system.
5. Was the emergency notification chain effective?
This remains under investigation.
6. Who should face legal consequences?
The inquiry has identified eight officials for suspension and disciplinary proceedings, while criminal proceedings were also ordered against responsible persons. Final legal responsibility will depend on further investigation and due process.
The Real Story Behind the PIMS Tragedy
The most important lesson from the PIMS fire may not be the identity of the first spark.
The real story is about preparedness.
A fire can start because of an electrical fault, damaged equipment or another unexpected technical problem.
But a modern hospital should be designed around the assumption that emergencies will happen.
The purpose of fire alarms, sprinklers, emergency exits, evacuation plans, staff training and regular drills is to stop an unexpected incident from becoming a mass-casualty event.
Fourteen newborn babies cannot tell us what happened inside that nursery.
Their parents can only ask questions.
And the responsibility of the authorities is to provide clear answers—not only about the fire, but about every preventable failure that came before it.
What Happens Next?
The interim inquiry is not the end of the matter.
Technical and forensic questions remain, particularly regarding the precise ignition source and the contribution of individual failures.
Parliamentary committees are also demanding additional records and accountability.
The National Assembly committee has called for criminal proceedings against those found responsible and has questioned whether the initial inquiry adequately addressed all the issues surrounding the tragedy.
The final investigation should therefore answer three fundamental questions:
What started the fire?
Why couldn’t 14 newborns be saved?
Who was responsible for the failures that made this tragedy possible?
Until those questions are fully answered, the story of the PIMS newborn deaths remains unfinished.
Watch the Full Documentary
This article is based on publicly available reports, official inquiry findings and parliamentary statements.
Watch the full documentary above to understand the complete timeline of the PIMS Hospital Islamabad fire, the inquiry findings, the safety failures and the question of accountability.
Documentary by Shahzad Lashari
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Frequently Asked Questions
How many newborn babies died in the PIMS fire?
14 newborn babies died in the August 26, 2026 fire at the PIMS Mother and Child Health Centre in Islamabad. One newborn was rescued.
When did the PIMS fire happen?
The fire occurred on August 26, 2026, in the third-floor nursery of the Mother and Child Health Centre at PIMS Islamabad.
What caused the PIMS hospital fire?
The exact technical ignition source has not been conclusively established by the interim inquiry. Different possibilities, including electrical equipment and air-conditioning or biomedical equipment, are being examined.
Were any hospital officials suspended?
Yes. The Prime Minister ordered the suspension of eight officials and directed disciplinary proceedings, with criminal proceedings against responsible persons.
Who saved the surviving newborn?
Staff Nurse Razia entered the burning nursery and rescued the only surviving newborn. The government approved a Rs10 million reward and recommended her for a civil award.
Is the investigation complete?
The report made public was an interim report. Technical and forensic matters, including the precise ignition source and final individual responsibility, were reserved for the comprehensive investigation.
